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Sovereign Default Risk in the Euro-Periphery and the Euro-Candidate Countries

by Hubert Gabrisch1), Lucjan T. Orlowski1)2) and Toralf Pusch1)
1) Halle Institute for Economic Research, 2) Sacred Heart University

Abstract:
This study examines the key drivers of sovereign default risk in five euro area periphery
countries and three euro-candidates that are currently pursuing independent monetary
policies. We argue that the recent proliferation of sovereign risk premiums stems from both
domestic and international sources. We focus on contagion effects of external financial crisis
on sovereign risk premiums in these countries, arguing that the countries with weak
fundamentals and fragile financial institutions are particularly vulnerable to such effects. The
domestic fiscal vulnerabilities include: economic recession, less efficient government
spending and a rising public debt. External ‘push’ factors entail increasing liquidity- and
counter-party risks in international banking, as well as risk-hedging appetites of international
investors embedded in local currency depreciation against the US Dollar. We develop a
model capturing the internal and external determinants of sovereign risk premiums and test
for the examined country groups. The results lead us to caution against premature fiscal
consolidation in the aftermath of the global economic crisis, since such policy might actually
worsen sovereign default risk. The model works well for the euro-periphery countries; it is
less robust for the euro-candidates that upon a future euro adoption will have to pursue real
economy growth oriented policies in order to mitigate a potential increase in sovereign
default risk.
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I.

Introduction

The recent proliferation of sovereign risk in the euro area and among some of the EU
members remaining outside the European common currency was not foreseen in the optimum
currency area (OCA) literature. The classic OCA theorems (R. Mundell’s labor mobility, R.
McKinnon’s trade diversification and P. Kenen’s production diversity) spell out economic
convergence conditions that purportedly result in a compression of government bond yields,
i.e. diminishing sovereign risk premia among the OCA members. The appropriateness of the
three leading OCA theories for sustainability of common currency areas has been widely
discussed, albeit and at times seriously questioned (Goodhart, 1998)1. In the aftermath of the
recent global financial crisis, the reality has evolved in the opposite direction. The recent
explosion of the euro-periphery sovereign risk as well as a discernible divergence of
sovereign bond yields among some of the euro-candidate countries (see Figure 1 a-b)
demonstrates that consolidation of the EU and euro area economies remains far from being
satisfactory.
These topical developments raise a number of questions that we aim to address in this
paper. The main investigative problem of our study is to examine whether adopting the euro
as opposed to maintaining a monetary autonomy is effective for lowering sovereign default
risk for a European Union Member State. We devise a model encompassing key determinants
of sovereign (default) risk premium (SRP) and test it for five selected euro-area members and
three euro-candidate countries. The selected euro members are those that have recently
experienced explosion of SRP: Spain, Portugal, Ireland, Italy, and Greece. The examined
euro-candidates are the largest EU New Member States that are pursuing independent
monetary policies based on the inflation targeting framework: Poland, Hungary and the
Czech Republic. Our exercise intends to highlight systemic differences between both country
groups. Our working assumption is that SRPs in the euro-periphery countries are driven by
both external and internal factors, with the leading role among the latter being played by the
level of public debt in relation to GDP. External factors are presumed to be key drivers of
SRPs in the candidate countries, as the public debt in this group has not reached an
acceleration threshold suggested by Reinhart, et al., (2012) at 90 percent of GDP.
We assume a standard definition of SRP as a difference between domestic and a lowrisk euro area long-term government bond yields. We contribute to the existing literature
examining drivers of SRP in two ways. First, our model distinguishes between sets of
domestic (local) and external factors determining SRP. It also includes the exchange rate visà-vis the US Dollar (USD), which can be interpreted as an interaction variable reflecting
relative changes between the domestic and the euro area economic conditions. Second, we
distinguish between euro-periphery and the euro-candidate countries as the influence of local
vis-à-vis external determinants on SRP is seemingly different.
Several hypothetical assumptions underlie our analysis. First, we argue that an
accelerated real GDP growth has a mitigating impact on SRP. Second, higher government
spending as a share of nominal GDP may actually reduce, rather than raise SRP. Third, a
1

An assertion by Goodhart (1998) is worth noting. He argues that the leading OCA theories have been derived
from a ‘Metallists’ view that the value of a currency depends on the intrinsic value of the backing of that
currency. The standard OCA models fail to recognize the importance of a ‘Cartalists’ approach whereas the
value of a currency must be backed by the fiscal power of the issuing authority. The latter has become
particularly relevant during the ongoing sovereign risk crisis in the euro area that streamlines policy solution for
the euro survival to the importance of establishing a common fiscal authority and a cohesive fiscal policy.
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rising public debt has a strong, direct impact on SRP regardless of monetary conditions, i.e.
the actual euro adoption of the candidacy status. The euro adoption does not provide a shield
against this causal interaction. Fourth, SRPs in both country groups are likely to be strongly
influenced by deteriorating global credit risks and counter-party risks among international
banks that we proxy by inclusion of the TED spread in our analytical model. Fifth, we
assume that local currency depreciation will raise SRP, particularly in heavily indebted
countries with lax fiscal discipline. Yet we argue that SRPs in the examined countries are
affected by the expected exchange rate trend, and not by the observed variations in the
exchange rate.
Our paper is organized as follows. Section II is an overview of pertinent literature.
Section III analyzes SRP in an open-economy framework. The distinction between domestic
and international drivers of SRP is explicated further in Section IV. The recent time path of
SRP for the euro members and, separately, for the euro candidates is shown and discussed in
Section V. The testable form of our model of SRP determination is shown in Section VI, and
its empirical tests are examined in Section VII. The main conclusions and policy
recommendations are summarized in Section VIII.

I.

Literature Survey on Causal Interactions between Macroeconomic Stability
and Sovereign Risk

The effects of macroeconomic policy adjustment have been traditionally assessed in the
economic literature and by policy-makers in terms of their impact on individual
macroeconomic policy targets, namely, real GDP growth or inflation. Among the domestic
determinants of SRP identified in our study, we draw attention to the effects of changes in
government spending and public debt in relation to GDP on SRP. Moreover, we view SRP as
a hybrid, proxy indicator of combined macroeconomic and financial stability.2 Such approach
seems to gain merit, particularly in the aftermath of the recent global financial crisis, which
has proven that policy prescriptions aimed solely at macroeconomic stability had a
fundamental flaw as they have largely ignored the impact of financial stability on
macroeconomic stability, assuming unconditional market efficiency and absence of financial
bubbles (see for instance, Orlowski, 2008b; Skidelsky, 2009; Gjerstad/Smith, 2009).
While the literature investigates various domestic and external factors affecting
sovereign default risk, the interplay between them under various monetary regimes has been
marginalized. We aim to focus our study on this vacant issue. When a monetary regime has
changes from sovereign currencies to a monetary union, the relative importance of fiscal visà-vis financial risk factors also changes. In a sovereign currency framework, fiscal policies
may follow the concept of ‘functional finance’ pioneered by Lerner (1943), where deficits
and public debt ratios are purposely changed by a government in response to specific needs to
stabilize the real economy. However, in a monetary union, a single national government no
longer plays a role of a common fiscal authority. It becomes a provincial fiscal agent and it
can borrow only when financial markets are ready to provide liquidity. Therefore, integration
with the union-wide financial markets becomes deeper and it imposes constraints on national
fiscal policies. The functional finance concept helps us draw the distinction between the europeriphery and the euro-candidates. While the euro-candidates can enact fiscal policies
consistent with the functional finance concept, the euro-members can no longer do so.
2

We apply a standard definition of SRP as a spread between yields on domestic versus benchmark low-risk
long-term government bonds, such as U.S. Treasuries or German Bunds.
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In dynamic terms, a long-term objective of minimizing SRP is important for growth
and overall stability. A lower country risk environment is crucial for attracting international
investment in tangible and financial assets that in turn brings about job creation and income
growth. By expanding taxable income, it has a long-run ‘loop’ effect on fiscal soundness and
sustainability.
There is no uniform agreement on the medium- and long-term effects of fiscal
impulses on sovereign default risk. For this reason, the causal connection between fiscal
impulses and SRP remains loose. One theoretical background is the Keynesian multiplier; a
fiscal expansion in terms of public final consumption or public investment contributes to
output and employment stabilization in recessionary times. However, the impact on the
sovereign risk premium remains ambiguous. If financial markets expected a positive output
response, sovereign default risk should stay unchanged. If financial markets are uncertain
about the predictability of the output response, the sovereign risk might increase in the shortperiod and fall (or not) in the longer perspective. Also, the so-called non-Keynesian effects of
a fiscal stimulus are assumed to lead to crowding out of private investment, hence ending up
in higher inflation, unchanged output, but in an increase in SRP.
The effects of fiscal policy adjustment have been traditionally assessed in the
economic literature and by policy-makers in terms of their impact on specific macroeconomic
policy targets, namely, real GDP growth or inflation. In our analysis, we draw attention to
repercussions of a government spending and public debt on SRP, which defines conditions of
financial stability as a pre-requisite for sustainable real-economy growth and price stability in
the long-run. Such approach seems to gain merit, particularly in the aftermath of the recent
global financial crisis, which has proven that policy prescriptions aimed solely at
macroeconomic stability suffer from a fundamental flaw as they have largely ignored the goal
of financial stability3.
The recent debate examining fiscal policy effects pertains to the efficiency of
government stimulus programs, such as the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act or
Germany’s ‘Konjunkturpakete I und II’. The central investigative issue is whether the recent
stimulus programs will have positive or neutral/negative effects on output growth. The
answer to this conundrum depends on the relative proportion of the spending multipliers to
the ‘crowding-out’ effects. A multiplier effect takes place when a fiscal stimulus is
transmitted with some impact lag into higher consumer and investment spending that is
funded with the initial income earned from the economic activity paid for by the government.
The opposite ‘crowding-out effect’ is present when higher government spending has no
impact on output growth, as it is offset by a decline in private spending. The initial income
injected by the government is saved by private agents rather than spent in the economy. The
subsequent income decline is attributable to higher interest rates and expectations of future
tax increases in response to the initial increase in government spending. These positive or
negative effects of fiscal stimulus on output have been recently investigated in the empirical
literature. A number of recent studies have indicated a sharp decline in spending and tax
multipliers stemming from the recent financial crisis, providing some merit to crowding out
3

We do not aim to test the Barro-Ricardian equivalence, which rejects the idea that a fiscal stimulus has an
impact on financial markets and interest rates, and is tested mainly by investigating the behavior of consumers.
We are led to believe that the Barro-Ricardo equivalence and the resulting policy prescriptions are inadequate
for understanding the effects of a fiscal stimulus on financial and real economy stability. Such reasoning
neglects the impact of a financial sector, which is crucial in our approach.
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effects (IMF, 2008; Égert, 2010; Wieland, 2010). Other studies seem to support prevalence of
positive effects of fiscal spending on output in spite of the decline in the value of fiscal
multipliers during the recent crisis (Cwik/Wieland, 2009; Corsetti, et al., 2009). Current
econometric models for the U.S. estimate that a tax cut has a multiplier effect of about 1.0,
while the multiplier effect for government spending is 1.6 after about 18 months (Romer,
2009). Both multipliers have fallen from their long-term normal levels that exceed two by a
large margin.
The recent literature on the link between fiscal policy and asset prices, as well as
sovereign default risk focuses mainly on causal effects of changes in the value of financial
assets on government budget positions. The predominant finding is not surprising - higher
equity and housing prices tend improve fiscal balances, as they raise revenues from property
taxes.4 We emphasize the opposite transmission, i.e. from changes in fiscal position on SRPs.
The prevalent views in the literature about the transmission of fiscal impulses on
sovereign risk can be encapsulated as follows:
1. Fiscal deficits amplify sovereign risk premiums, particularly at times of financial
distress (von Hagen, et al., 2011). This evidence is extracted from the empirical
methods capturing short- to medium-term effects.
2. There is mixed evidence that government debt levels at the time of borrowing
have positive impact on risk premiums. Von Hagen et al., (2011) question such
evidence for EU countries based on the early pre-crisis data. However, in the
aftermath of the 2008-2010 global financial crisis, the public debt proliferation has
been a critical contributing factor to the 2010-2011 sovereign risk explosion in the
euro-periphery. In the case of the U.S., such causal relationship has been diluted
since 2004 due to massive international purchases of U.S. securities
(Chinn/Frankel, 2007). Nevertheless, Chung et al. (2012) find that a one
percentage-point increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio raises the real yield on
equilibrium 10-year U.S. Treasury bond by about six basis points.
3. The detachment of long-term equilibrium yields from government bonds in
Europe has been widely attributed to a successful convergence of bond yields
during the period preceding the euro inception and extending until the recent
global financial crisis (Codogno et al., 2003; Côté/Graham, 2004; Kim, et al.,
2006), as shown in our Fig. 1a. There is also evidence of bond yield compression
of the 2004 EU accession countries after 2003, but not in the preceding period
(Orlowski/Lommatzsch, 2005; Orlowski, 2008a). There is a visible divergence of
sovereign bond yields in the aftermath of the recent financial crisis
(Gabrisch/Orlowski, 2010), as shown also in Fig. 1b below.
4. Institutional quality of fiscal authorities plays a critical role in this transmission
process (Hallerberg/Wolff, 2006). Lower risk premiums strongly depend on
established fiscal policy rules and the thoroughness of the policy monitoring as
argued by Gjersem (2003), Chinn/Frankel (2007) and IMF (2008). However, this
transmission has been recently distorted by the financial crisis, the flaws in credit
rating systems, liquidity preferences of international investors, and various debt
issuance techniques by governments.

4

See Égert (2010) among others, for compelling evidence.
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We examine validity of the above assertions in our model and its empirical testing,
particularly the association between SRP and changes in government spending as well as
public debt in relation to GDP. The transmission of fiscal impulse into lower SRP seems
entirely possible under both the mainstream balanced budget and ‘tax smoothing’. The
balanced budget policy relies on the low level of public spending and of taxes that is suitable
for ‘normal’ business cycle conditions. In a straightforward way, a continuous fiscal
discipline results in a low public debt that translates into a lower risk premium. The problem
arises when the economy is in a prolonged recession with high unemployment. The orthodox
approach to tax smoothing allows for fiscal expansion and debt accumulation during ‘normal’
recessions (as oppose to depressions). The public debt is expected to be repaid when the
economy returns to a stable growth path. Keynes added to this scenario a policy prescription
for more permanent downturns arguing that larger than normal fiscal stimuli were needed at
the time of more persistent recessions. His followers in the 1960s expanded the traditional
approach by adding cyclically-adjusted revenue and expenditure components to the countercyclical policy. Their policy framework compares actual revenues and expenditures with the
estimated ones for the economy reaching its full potential. Hence, a deep negative output gap
necessitates more-than-normal expansionary fiscal policy. Thus in sum, the Keynesian policy
course calls for expansions during recession, while the counter-cyclical post-Keynesian view
maintains a fiscal stimuli until the negative output gap is eradicated. In the long-run, a fiscal
expansion in either form is likely to restore confidence of consumers and investors whose
increased spending can overcome an economic downturn. A counter-cyclical fiscal policy
should reverse taxes and expenditures into a restrictive gear when the negative output gap
comes down to an end. In all, a counter-cyclical fiscal policy is likely to engender a low risk
environment for consumers and investors in the long-run. However, the risk-abating goal will
not be reached when fiscal expansion becomes chronic and pro-cyclical, motivated by shortterm non-economic factors, including political, populist pressures (Buti/van den Noord, 2004;
Kaminsky, et al., 2004; Hallerberg/Wolff, 2006; Golinelli/Momigliano, 2009). Execution of
this goal can be also distorted by the discrepancy between the policy design and
implementation stages. Among others, Golinelli/Momigliano (2009) find that in spite of
declaration of fiscal discipline, the euro area governments have a tendency to loosen fiscal
stance during the policy implementation stage. Bernoth, et al. (2008) go further by arguing
that fiscal policy in the euro area countries is planned mainly as counter-cyclical, but its
realization has become predominantly pro-cyclical.

II.

A Model of Sovereign Risk Premium in Open-Economy Setting

We augment the existing literature by investigating a nexus between domestic and
external drivers of SRP and by adding a task of mitigating sovereign risk premium to the
counter-cyclical fiscal policy framework. Our basic assumption is that the external factors
have a dominant impact on SRPs in the economies with autonomous monetary regimes, while
local factors prevail in the financially integrated economies within a currency union. We
further assume that during a period of deep recession when there is a real threat of systemic
risk (defined as a high probability of a permanent damage to real economic growth and
financial stability), a government enacts a fiscal stimulus of a magnitude sufficient for
abating such risk at a predetermined future period. At the same time, the government should
indicate willingness to revert to a normal, disciplined policy or to a budget surplus when
certain stability conditions are met. Such conditions should include elimination of both the
systemic risk and the negative output gap. It is imperative that the government stimulus
programs entail mainly the ‘exhaustive’ government spending that directly engenders income
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growth and subsequently promotes real consumption and business fixed investment5. In
addition, fiscal consolidation cannot be enacted prematurely; as such action could worsen
credit risk as well as systemic risk. When the economic growth is restored and probability of
systemic risk is minimized to a certain threshold level, the transmission of fiscal stimulus into
a decline in SRP may be viewed as completed. We further recognize that contagion effects of
externally-induced financial crisis are significant in small economies with capital asset
liberalization. These adverse, destabilizing reactions will be stronger in countries with
derailed fiscal discipline and weak overall macroeconomic fundamentals.
We begin from the identification of domestic vis-à-vis external factors that influence a
SRP. In general terms the determinants of SRP can be specified as

SRP = f ( LRF , ERF , ER )

(1)

The sovereign risk premium (SRP) is a function of local risk factors (LRF), exogenous risk
factors (ERF) and the exchange rate (ER). LRF are affected by a range of complex indicators
that are seemingly inter-connected. They include macroeconomic fundamentals, domestic
credit conditions and domestic liquidity constraints. Thus in essence, LRF encompasses
systemic risk (including default risk), credit risk and liquidity risk in the economy. It strongly
depends on actual changes in fiscal, monetary and regulatory policies that purport whether
the overall policy will be sustainable and credible. The macroeconomic risk largely depends
on the size of fiscal deficit and the public debt, both assessed in relation to the current
nominal GDP. Our view of fiscal policy stance is a bit broader than the standard treatment of
fiscal determinants of government bond yields and sovereign risk premiums that focuses
mainly on public debt-to-GDP ratio as a proxy of these fundamentals (Eichengreen/Mody,
2000; Codogno, et al., 2003; Marattin/Salotti, 2010). We emphasize mainly changes in the
budget deficit position, in addition to an increase in public debt. The role of fiscal impulses as
a source of sovereign risk is downplayed in the standard literature that assumes, in our
opinion somewhat arbitrarily, that increases in government deficits are uniformly translated
into higher public debt. As evidenced by Codogno et al., (2003), Marattin/Salotti (2010) and
Égert (2010), this transmission is not linear, namely, fiscal expansion in high-debt economies
has a stronger multiplicative impact on sovereign bond spreads (thus higher SRP) than in
low-debt countries.
Considering disposition of policy preferences, we can rewrite the above function as
k

l

i =1

i =1

SRPt +τ = γ 0 + γ 1 ∑ LRFt + (1 − γ 1 ) ∑ ERFt + κ ERt

In this specification

k

∑ LRF

t

(2)

represents k-number of pertinent domestic risk factors and

i =1

l

∑ ERF

t

is a set of exogenous factors. Parameter γ 0 reflects a long-term risk premium that

i =1

depends on dynamic transformation of structural and institutional factors affecting sovereign
risk, γ 1 is a weight parameter showing importance of local relative to exogenous risk
5

For a comprehensive review of key features of effective government spending programs that contribute to
sustained economic growth, particularly in the aftermath of the recent global financial crisis, see IMF (2010).
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determinants, κ is an interaction parameter of local and exogenous determinants of exchange
rate movements, and τ is the impact lag of changes in domestic relative to foreign risk
factors on SRP. It can be noted that for smaller open economies with flexible exchange rates
γ 1 will be relatively low and κ significant. For the countries with fixed exchange rate
regimes κ is equal zero. For large economies with a low degree of openness to trade and
capital flows γ 1 will be high, closer to the unity, and κ relatively low.
The LFR group includes a long list of factors that affect SRP, they are probably too
complex for examination in a single study. We focus on changes in the real economy growth,
ratio of government spending to GDP and the public debt in relation to GDP. We admit that
proliferation of public debt does not always stem from a fiscal stimulus. Among other
contributing factors, it depends on exchange rate changes, particularly when a large share of
government debt is denominated in foreign currency. In our model, the ER component can be
viewed as an interaction variable between local and exogenous risk factors, as an interplay
between these factors always affects local currency movement against a benchmark low-risk
currency. If local risks outweigh foreign or global market risk, domestic currency will
depreciate in line with the ‘flight-to-quality’ in international capital markets.
Changes in ERF also affect yield spreads on local versus selected low risk benchmark
government bonds6, thus alter the SRPt = itd − it f , where itd and it f represent yields on
domestic and foreign (benchmark) government bonds respectively. Elevated international
market risk stemming from concerns about global financial and political stability, as well as
the expected course of the global output always induce investors to seek the safety of low risk
benchmark bonds, contributing to lower yields on these bonds and to higher SRP for smaller,
open economies. For large autonomous economies with a good fiscal track-record it f+τ is
close to zero, since the projected yield on domestic bonds is the benchmark country yield.
The inclusion of ERP in our model is backed by a strong support in the empirical literature.
Among others, Bernoth and Erdogan (2010) argue that SRP within the euro area can be
explained by a common international factor that reflects risk aversion by global investors. At
times of elevated financial market risk, international investors tend to buy low-risk assets and
sell high-risk sovereign bonds, contributing to rising yields on risky sovereigns and higher
SRP for more risky economies. This “flight-to-safety” process at times of financial distress is
also highlighted in a recent financial market model developed by Brunnermeier and Pedersen
(2009).
We now proceed to a more detailed specification of domestic and external factors
affecting interest rate differentials vis-à-vis a risk-free rate, i.e. sovereign risk premia.

III.

Domestic and International Factors Affecting Sovereign Risk

The literature that examines determinants and key drivers of sovereign default risk identifies
a wide range of its domestic and external sources. Chief among the ‘local’ economy factors
the ability of a country to maintain fiscal discipline, or in other words, sustainability of the
6

The term ‘benchmark bonds’ is used here for government bonds with a long maturity of 10 years (as in the
notation of Thompson Reuter’s Data Stream).
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public debt, captured mainly by the trend in the public debt-to-GDP ratio. This factor has
been found significant in affecting country risk by Codogno et al. (2003), Haugh, et al.,
(2009), Marratin and Salotti (2010), Bernoth and Erdogan (2010), among others. The recent
increase in the likelihood of default on debt repayments by the euro-periphery countries has
contributed to the widening spreads on benchmark bond yields in the euro area and has
played a pivotal role in proliferation of the euro-periphery sovereign risk crisis of 2010-2011.
Moreover, there is an increasing consensus in the literature that the current data on the
government budget deficit position are less predictive for long-term interest rates than the
expected deficit-to-GDP ratios. For instance, in a path-breaking study Canzoneri, et al.,
(2002) find that a 1 percent deterioration in projected fiscal deficit 5 to 10 years ahead widens
the term spread of 10Y over 3M U.S. Treasuries by 41-60 basis points. A similar reaction of
long term interest rates to a projected rather than an actual fiscal deficit has been found more
recently for the EU countries, especially for the euro area economies by Haugh et al., (2009)
as well as Bernoth and Erdogan (2010), and for the OECD member countries by Ardagna, et
al., (2007). In addition to the expected degree of fiscal discipline, the institutional quality of
fiscal authorities has a significant impact on sovereign default risk (Hallerberg and Wolff,
2006). Fiscal policy clarity and transparency coupled with a high level of tax discipline help
mitigate the risk of default on government bond interest repayments.
There is increasing empirical evidence that not only the public, but also the private sector
debt and default risk strongly affect sovereign default risk. Altman and Rijken (2011) bring a
valuable new dimension to research on the determination of sovereign default risk by
showing that it strongly depends on aggregate default risk of a nation’s private sector. They
assess a corporate health index for the private sectors of the U.S. and nine European countries
on the basis of the new Risk Metrics’ Z-Metrics system, concluding that the index provides
an effective warning indicator and an appropriate hierarchy of relative sovereign risk for the
examined countries. Their assessment of corporate health index as a driver of SRP is
certainly more appropriate for the economies dominated by a large number of publicly listed
corporations, and perhaps less relevant for countries whose national income is generated
predominantly by small businesses. The private banking sector plays an important role for
SRP as well, as tested in a study by Dötz and Fischer (2010). We choose to omit these factors
as they may interact with other independent variables included in our model.
In addition to indebtedness of the public and the private sectors, the institutional strength
and the depth of financial markets are also critical for ameliorating sovereign default risk.
Domestic financial market liquidity, as measured by bid/ask spreads is important in the
determination of sovereign bond spreads within the European Monetary Union (Gómez-Puig,
2006; Abad et al., 2010). The market size, depth and breadth also help reduce sovereign risk
(Bernoth, et al., 2004). The impact of liquidity constraints on SRP depends on the prevalent
level of interest rates. Manganelli and Wolswijk (2009) find that liquidity variations explain
nearly half of the interest rate spread when the rates are high. They also prove a positive link
between interest rate levels and SRP in the euro area in ‘normal’ market periods (specifically
for the sample period March 1999 – April 2008).
A key domestic institutional factor affecting SRP is stability of domestic financial
markets and strength of local financial institutions. The development of private financial
markets and the ability of financial institutions to attract foreign capital have an important
impact on the severity of defaults, thus also on sovereign default risk (Gennaioli, et al., 2010).
It is because sound financial institutions by attracting both domestic and foreign capital and
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leverage provide an internal discipline for the government to repay its debt (Altman and
Rijken, 2011). Moreover, changes in SRP show high sensitivity to the size and the structure
of national banking sectors, as argued by Gerlach et al. (2010).
Recent studies examining sovereign risk suggest influence of the size of the economy.
Gültekin-Karakaş et al., (2011) provide evidence that credit rating agencies give higher
ratings to developed industrial countries than to emerging market economies regardless of
macroeconomic fundamentals. Particularly puzzling is a higher credit rating of Western
European countries in contrast to East European transition economies that ignores fiscal and
current account balance positions. However, this finding should be interpreted with a caution,
as the Western European bond markets are larger and provide investors with a lower liquidity
risk and transaction costs, thus yields on bonds traded in Eastern markets contain a liquidity
risk premium.
As we imply by the design of our model, not only domestic but externally-generated or
foreign factors affect an individual country’s SRP. Among them, variations in foreign shortterm interest rates appear to be most influential. A rise in foreign relative to domestic interest
rates is likely to induce capital outflows, thus exacerbate country risk in a small open
economy. Moreover, spreads between local interbank lending rates and a risk free
international benchmark rate indicate, such as the TED spread or the Libor-OIS spread,
indicate tensions in global credit markets, thus reflect credit risk and counter-party risk
conditions in international banking. As argued by Orlowski (2008b) variations in the TED
spread during the recent global financial crisis have helped explain the crisis’ main stages and
deranged intensity.
External factors affecting capital flows are transmitted mainly via contagion effects of
global financial crises. These external factors are also referred to in the literature as
‘common’ or ‘push’ factors affecting capital inflows. They play a dominant role in
determining capital flows to emerging market economies over the ‘pull’, i.e. country-specific
factors. A balance of dynamics between the ‘push’ and the ‘pull’ factors affects the actual net
capital flows and is strongly correlated with the individual country risk. Specifically, low risk
economies with stable currencies and resilient financial markets are likely to experience large
capital inflows driven by the ‘push’ forces, particularly at times of global financial distress.
As a result of large capital inflows, their bond yields will fall (bond prices increase) and the
SRP will decline further. A compelling evidence on the prevalence of the ‘push’ over the
‘pull’ factors, particularly for the emerging markets and during the 2009-2010 period is
presented by Fratzscher (2011). A similar preponderance of the ‘push’ over the ‘pull’ factors
holds true for the pre-crisis period. As evidenced by Codogno et al. (2003), sovereign bond
spreads in emerging markets are strongly affected by both the yield on US government bonds
and/or the slope of the US yield curve. In the euro area, widening yield spreads between the
euro-periphery domestic and the low-risk euro-core sovereign bonds have been recently
somewhat mitigated by new capital transfer mechanisms to the smaller, more indebted euro
area members.
Liquidity constraints in international financial markets are also likely to affect domestic
bond yields, particularly in the absence of controls on capital inflows. Particularly in times of
uncertainty in global markets, international investors become risk-adverse and allocate capital
in countries with low-default risk (Codogno et al., 2003, Sgherri and Zoli, 2009). Such
situation was certainly prevalent at the peak of the recent global financial crisis in
October/November 2008 (Orlowski, 2008b). A particularly important role in proliferation of
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the recent global financial crisis has been played by tensions in global credit markets and
inter-bank lending as measured by the TED spread, i.e. the difference between the short-term
(3M) USD Libor and the (3M) US T-bill yield. In essence, the TED spread reflects the degree
of global credit risk and the counter-party risk in the international banking system. We are led
to believe that SRPs of several European countries whose economic development is financed
by credits from large international banks (Ireland, Spain, Portugal in particular) are likely to
deteriorate with increasing global credit and counter-party risks. Their economic growth
prospects may suffer as a result of a global credit squeeze. Moreover, significant proliferation
of credit risk in international banking engenders a global systemic risk (Orlowski, 2012).
On a more general note, there is a consensus in the literature that a buildup of SRP
usually follows a long-term, dynamic trend. As argued among others by Ang and Piazzesi
(2003), it is not typically influenced by short-term financial market sentiments.

IV.

Unsustainable Convergence of Bond Yield Spreads

Before devising a testable model of SRP determination, we wish to highlight the dramatic
shifts in convergence (and divergence) patterns of spreads between yields on local and the
German long-term sovereign bonds. We show the time patterns of these spreads for the five
(peripheral) euro-area members, i.e. Spain, Portugal, Ireland, Italy and Greece in Figure 1a.
Separately, Figure 1b shows the pattern of local vis-à-vis German bond spreads for the three
largest euro candidate countries that are pursuing independent monetary policies (guided by
inflation targeting) with flexible exchange rates against the euro: Poland, Hungary and the
Czech Republic.
….. insert Figures 1a and 1b around here …..
As shown in Figure 1a, the sovereign bond yield compression for the euro-area members
was nearly perfect (albeit illusory) during the period between the euro inception in 1999 and
the peak of the recent global financial crisis in October/November 2008. Yet, that yield
convergence was clearly detached from the pronounced differences in fiscal discipline and
other institutional and structural discrepancies between the euro core and the euro periphery.
It was based on perceptions of the euro eminent success and possible bailouts of the states
with lingering fiscal imbalances. At the peak of the crisis, the collapse of Lehman Brothers
triggered a surge in the TED spread (to 464 bps on October 10, 2008) reflecting a global
credit freeze and the outbreak of extreme liquidity and counter-party risks in international
banking, which ultimately intensified expectations of a global systemic risk. These extreme
or ‘tail’ risks associated with escalating volatility of interbank lending rates, exchange rates,
stock market indexes, both public and private bond yields and other financial market
indicators were most absorbed by countries with derailed public finances, highly leveraged
banking systems, and outright manipulation of Libor by the leading global banks (Orlowski,
2012). That unbalanced absorption of various types of financial risks ultimately led to
significant divergence of sovereign bond yield spreads, which was the most pronounced in
the cases of Greek, Irish, Italian and Portuguese government bonds. To this date, bailout
plans aimed at rescuing the most affected euro-periphery countries and the proposed
strategies for restoring effective bond yield convergence for the euro area have been rather
ineffective.
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Somewhat less dramatic swings in sovereign bond yields have been experienced by the
euro candidates. As shown in Figure 1b, convergence of their local to the German bond
yields proceeded effectively, particularly during the period between their EU accession in
May 2004 and the outbreak of the financial crisis in August 2007, albeit at a slow and varied
pace. The Czech government bond yields became effectively aligned with the German Bund
yields; the spread between them was even negative in 2002/03 and in the first half of 2007.
Yield spreads for Hungary have been consistently the largest among the examined euro
candidates, as a result of this country’s higher government budget deficit and public debt to
GDP ratios. In addition, spikes in Hungarian and Czech yields in 2009 stemmed from
elevated political risks that triggered expectations of deteriorating fiscal imbalances.
However, since the third quarter of 2010, the bond yield spreads for all three countries have
been declining, in contrast to the rising spreads among the euro-periphery members. This
may suggest that a better policy scenario for the euro candidates is, at least for the time-being,
the detachment from the euro area that allows for a disciplined pursuit of autonomous fiscal
and monetary policies. These policies are essential for avoiding a surge of exchange rate risk,
namely, a local currency depreciation that could translate into a higher SRP.
Nevertheless, we refrain from endorsing a deep, indiscriminate fiscal consolidation for
both the euro area members and the euro candidate countries. Severe cuts in government
spending could reduce national income by a stronger proportion, thus they may lead to a
severe economic recession and a subsequent deterioration, i.e. an increase in SRP.

V.

A Model of SRP Determination

The key factors affecting SRP discussed above allow us to expand the model of SRP
determination. In Eq. (2), we made a distinction between domestic and external drivers of
SRP. Among complex domestic, local drivers of SRP, we focus on the role of real GDP
G
growth rate yt , the ratio of government spending-to-nominal GDP   , and the total public
 Y t

D
debt-to-nominal GDP   . Therefore, the local, domestic risk factors LRFit for a single
 Y t
country i are reflected by
G
D
LRFit = α 0 + α1 yit +τ + α 2   + α 3   + µit'
 Y it +τ
 Y it +τ

(3)

The displacement parameters τ reflect various optimal impact leads or lagged effects of
the independent variables on LRF.
In a similar vein, we dissect the ERFt into its key components, which should include at
minimum an elevated credit risk and counter-party risk among leading global financial
institutions that are roughly proxied by the TED spread, i.e. the spread between 3M USD
Libor and 3M US Treasury bill yield. As proven by the recent global financial crisis,
increased tensions in global credit markets pass through into higher sovereign default risk in
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the economies with weaker fundamentals with a certain time lag (Orlowski, 2012). We also
insert into the model a dummy variable FCD reflecting the financial crisis and the post-crisis
periods, as opposed to the pre-crisis time of (illusive) stability. Considering these factors, the
ERF is specified as
ERFt = β 0 + β1TEDt +τ + β 2 FCD + µt''

(4)

The ‘interactive’ variable capturing relative developments in local versus foreign
fundamentals is the spot exchange rate et . In our tested model, the exchange rate reflects
changes in the USD values of local currencies, that is, the Euro for the periphery countries
and the Czech Koruna, Polish Zloty and the Hungarian Forint for the candidate countries. The
exchange rate against the USD is chosen due to the continuous function of the USD as the
leading international reserve currency.
The combined impact on of LRF, ERF and e of a group of N countries on SRP is shown
by

N
N
N
N
G
 D
SRP
y
TED
FCD
=
γ
+
α
+
α
+
α
+
β
+
β
+
β
∑
it
0
1 ∑ i ,t +τ
2 ∑
3 ∑
1
t +τ
2
3 ∑ei ,t +τ +ξt


i =1
i =1
i =1  Y i ,t +τ
i =1  Y i ,t +τ
i =1
N

(5)
In this specification, changes in SRP are driven by the τ -lagged changes in the local factors
that include the real GDP growth, government spending-to-GDP, and public debt-to-GDP
ratios. They are also associated with external factors such as the TED spread and the financial
crisis dummy, as well as the local currency value of the US Dollar.
As noted above, short-term money market and credit market effects on SRP in a given
country are captured by the TED spread and by the exchange rate. These risks have played a
crucial role in the propagation of the 2007-2008 global financial crisis (Orlowski, 2008b) and
subsequently during the euro area sovereign default risk crisis in 2009-2011 (Orlowski,
2012). Both variables might not reflect all responses of capital markets in case of global
shocks. We insert a dummy for the outbreak financial crisis since the third quarter 2007
(FCD). In essence, this dummy captures portfolio adjustments of international investors and
their spillover effects on local equity markets.
The empirical tests of Eq.(5) are shown and discussed in the next section. Descriptive
statistics for the tested variables, as well as their unit root tests are provided in Appendix A.
Evidently, all variables are non-stationary at their levels and become stationary at their first
differences.

VI.

Empirical Tests for Euro-Periphery and Euro-Candidates

The process prescribed by Eq.(5) is tested for the two sets of countries: the euro-periphery
and the euro-candidate states – the selection of which we have explained above. We aim to
demonstrate whether there are significant differences in the impact of local versus external
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factors on SRPs between these two distinctive groups. In essence, we intend to show whether
adoption of the euro as opposed to a monetary independence helps mitigate country risk
associated with fiscal imbalances and whether it shields a local financial system from
contagion effects of an externally-generated crisis.
Due to a limited number of quarterly data, we employ pooled least square estimations
for both groups, and subsequently check robustness of these tests by running regressions on
stacked (panel) data for both groups. In all cases, we enter the variables in first differences
since all the tested data series are non-stationary at their levels. The tests are optimized by
applying appropriate lag (or lead) operators for all variables, and their optimized combination
is obtained by minimizing the Akaike and Schwartz Information Criteria. The results of the
pooled least square estimations are shown in Tables 1a and 1b, for the euro-periphery and the
euro-candidates respectively.
….. insert Tables 1 a and 1b around here …..
The results shown in Table 1a suggest that all independent variables in Eq.(5) are
highly significant for the five euro-periphery countries. SRPs are inversely related to future
(forwarded by two quarters) changes in real GDP growth rates. In other words, SRPs are
likely to decline if capital market investors expect acceleration of economic growth in these
countries, and reversely, they will increase as expectations of economic recession or a
slowdown become apparent. The government spending as a share of GDP is even more
significantly related to SRP. An increase in this ratio results in a lower SRP with a onequarter lag. This finding leads us to caution against a deep fiscal consolidation, i.e. sharp cuts
in government spending, which may potentially aggravate rather than mitigate sovereign
default risk through their detrimental short-term impact on economic growth and unfavorable
outlook for investment. As it can be intuitively expected, a rise in the public debt-to-GDP
ratio tends to exacerbate SRP in the euro-periphery countries. This magnifying effect of
rising public debt on sovereign default risk has been widely investigated and agreed upon in
the literature (recently, for example by Reinhart/Sbrancia, 2011).
The external factors have a significant impact on SRPs in the euro-periphery countries
as well. A rising TED spread that reflects tensions in credit markets and increasing counterparty risk among global banks tends to raise SRPs, at least with a one-quarter lag, as investors
recently have a tendency to pull out capital from more risky markets and allocate it in low
risk assets. The tests of our empirical model also confirm the recent proliferation of SRPs in
the euro-periphery countries through a positive, highly significant effect of the financial crisis
period dummy variable FCD. Changes in the USD-per-EUR exchange rate show a strong
inverse association with SRPs in these countries. Apparently, depreciation of the euro
accompanies a rise in sovereign default risk in the euro-periphery. Therefore, policy actions
aimed at stabilizing the euro, such as credible and sufficient bailout plans facilitated through
the European Stability Mechanism, or further steps toward fiscal policy coordination and
consolidated sovereign support for ECB liquidity injections are indispensable for mitigating
sovereign default risk in the crisis-prone euro area members. The cross-fixed country effects
show a strong increase in SRP for Greece, relative to the rest of the peer group.7
The estimation of our model (Eq.5) for the euro-candidate countries (Table 1b) shows
a different balance of key SRP drivers. This distinction stems from the main institutional
7

It could be argued that this significant increase displays parts of institutional weaknesses in the Greek
government sector which are not covered as such by our data base.
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differences between the euro-candidates and the euro-periphery countries that include: lower
public debt-to-GDP ratios in the candidates’ group, as well as their flexible exchange rates,
and historically more volatile government bond markets that were only introduced in the late
1990s in Hungary and early 2000s in Poland and the Czech Republic8. Business cycle
conditions, i.e. changes in real GDP growth rates have a stronger impact on SRP in the
candidate countries than in the periphery. As shown in Table 1b, an acceleration of economic
growth tends to reduce SRPs, with a two-quarter impact lead, with a factor by about 5 larger
than in the periphery. Equally important is the public debt level. Its increase in relation to
GDP is associated with higher SRPs. The TED spread tends to exacerbate SRPs in the
candidates’ group with a one-quarter impact lag. The influence of the changes on the USD
values of local currencies of the candidates is similar to those for the periphery states;
specifically, local currency depreciation tends to drive up SRP in both groups. This leads us
to argue that a euro adoption does not mitigate the exchange rate risk against the USD - the
key international capital asset currency. There are two major differences in the main drivers
of SRP among both country groups. First, the government spending-to-GDP ratio does not
play a significant role in the euro-candidates. Second, the financial crisis and the euro-crisis
periods captured by the FCD variable have no discernible impact on proliferation of SRP in
the three candidate countries. Apparently, they remain vulnerable to global credit market
conditions, but not directly affected by major shifts of capital flows related to the recent
crises. Arguably, their monetary autonomy along with a prudent macroeconomic policy
implementation helps them cushion possible contagion effects of such crisis episodes. The
cross fixed effects shown in Table 1b suggest a successful containment of SRP in Poland,
relative to the Czech Republic and, particularly, to Hungary. Nonetheless, the model
estimation for the candidate countries is less robust than that for the euro-periphery, as
implied by lower adjusted R-squared and F-statistics, and a higher sum of squared residuals.
We further test for robustness of the results obtained from the pooled data estimation
by performing least square regressions on stacked (panel) data. The results of the panel
estimations are shown in Tables 2a and 2b.
….. insert Tables 2 a and 2b around here …..
The obtained results for the euro-periphery countries shown in Table 2a are consistent
and more robust than those shown in Table 1a, as implied by much higher adjusted R-squared
(0.61 versus 0.45 respectively). The stacked data estimation shows a significant, inverse
relationship between the expected acceleration of real GDP growth and SRPs. Equally
meaningful impact on SRP increases is played by reduced government spending and by a
coincident increase in public debt. The external factors also play a strong role in SRP
proliferation. A higher TED spread evidently drives up SRPs in these countries, so does the
FCD dummy. Distinct to the results in Table 1a is the impact of an appreciation of the Euro
against the US dollar. While the pooled model with fixed effects yields a decrease of the
SRP, the regression with stacked data shows an increase in risk premiums in response to the
Euro appreciation (which also implies a SRP decrease associated with the Euro depreciation).
Since the regression estimation for the candidate countries (Table 2b) show a negative sign as
before, we conclude that the nominal exchange rate is not a robust regressor in the case of the
peripheral countries. This estimation also shows some country differences (Italy vis-à-vis the
others).
8

See Iorgova/Ong (2008) and Gabrisch/Orlowski (2010) for a more detailed description and discussion on the
evolution and stability of government bond markets in Central and Eastern Europe.
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We obtain results for the euro-candidates (Table 2b), somewhat different to the pooled
regression. The first improvement of the panel data estimation is that both fiscal variables are
now insignificant, underlining the weak relevance of fiscal positions in investors’ decision
making with respect to countries with sovereign currency. In addition, the difference between
the coefficients of the acceleration or deceleration of real economic growth is now more
pronounced (0.897 vs. 0.055) than in the pooled model specification. The external factors are
consistently significant, although their impact is less pronounced in the determination of SRP
for the candidates relative to the periphery. Specifically, the FCD variable drives up SRPs of
the euro-candidates, what it remained ambiguous in the pooled data regression (Table 1.b). A
further noteworthy result is that the TED spread has lost some of its former significance in
favor of the financial crisis dummy.
In sum, our empirical estimations suggest that the main difference among the drivers
or SRPs in the euro-periphery and the euro-candidate countries are the fiscal policy
indicators. Changes in the ratio of government spending-to-GDP and public debt-to-GDP
play a stronger role in the euro-periphery group, but are seemingly detached from SRP in the
candidate countries. The common SRP determinants in both groups of countries include the
expected economic growth and the external factors. The impact of the exchange rate on SRP
is less robust in the euro-periphery. Thus arguably, flexible exchange rate and monetary
independence of the candidates seemingly contribute to detachment of the exchange rate risk
from the sovereign default risk.
Overall, both pooled and panel data estimations suggest that the best policies to abate
sovereign default risk is to generate economic growth, but not necessarily to resort to deep
cuts in government spending. Moreover, the countries with weak fundamentals are
particularly and undeniably more susceptible to assimilation of external liquidity and
systemic risks.

VII.

A Synopsis

We have devised a model examining the major drivers of sovereign default risk in the
euro area periphery and the euro-candidate countries. In our model, SRP proxied by the
spread between the yields on local versus German 10Y government bonds depends on two
sets of domestic (country-specific) and external economy explanatory variables. The
domestic variables include quarterly changes in: real GDP growth, the government spendingto-GDP ratio, and the public debt-to-GDP. The external variables include the TED spread
(measured as a difference between three-month USD Libor rates and US T-bill yields) and
the dummy variable extracting the recent global financial crisis and the euro area sovereign
risk crisis from the sample period. In addition, we include the exchange rates specified as
USD values of local currencies as a connecting factor between local and external variables.
We conduct empirical tests of our model using pooled data and stacked pooled data
least squares methods for two groups of countries: five euro-periphery members and three
euro-candidates. This distinction is introduced to show differences in drivers of SRP and to
demonstrate whether the euro adoption by itself has a mitigating impact on sovereign default
risk The model yields robust results for the euro-periphery and somewhat less conclusive for
the euro-candidates. SRPs in the euro-periphery are driven strongly by both local and external
factors. The most decisive drivers of SRPs are the expected real GDP growth, government
spending and public debt ratios, the external factors and the EUR in USD exchange rate. Both
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the local and the external factors included in our model are strongly related proliferation of
SRPs in the euro-periphery. Our focal result is that an increase in government spending is
likely to reduce SRPs, with at least a one-quarter lag. This result questions validity of sharp
fiscal consolidation and containment of government spending for the purpose of lowering
sovereign default risk, at least in a short-run horizon.
SRPs in the euro-candidate group are predominantly associated with expected changes
in economic growth. Local fiscal variables are by far less significant in this group. Contagion
effects of elevated risks in global credit markets play some, although less significant role in
proliferation of SRPs in these countries. We therefore argue that continuation of policies
stimulating real economy growth is a correct venue for abating sovereign default risk. It is
also essential for these countries to preserve a sound banking system by avoiding excessive
bank leverage and protecting solvency of financial institutions, as means to avoid
proliferation of sovereign default risk.
The model prescribed by Eq. 5 and its empirical tests further allow us to argue that no
single country seems to be immune to contagion effects of external financial crises,
regardless whether it has or has not adopted the euro. Moreover, the impact of the financial
crisis dummy variable is stronger in the case of the euro-periphery which financial systems
are integration with the entire euro area. Thus evidently, the financial integration makes these
countries more susceptible to external financial shocks. We may further argue that contagion
effects of external crises ought to be mitigated with well-known measures, including higher
capital adequacy requirements proposed by the Basel III directives, and low costs of bank
borrowings consistent with the near-zero targets for short-term interest rates pursued by the
U.S. Federal Reserve and several other central banks. Yet, this venue of investigative
research remains outside the boundaries of this study.
It shall be further noted that policy-makers in the EU will be well-advised to
recognize that declarations of new macroprudential policies and the official policy decrees
are not a panacea for curbing sovereign default risk problems. Neither is a recommendation
for a fast-track euro adoption by the euro-candidates. Sound macroeconomic fundamentals
and macroprudential regulations, along with pro-growth policies are essential for preventing
possible proliferation of sovereign default risk in the future.

18

References
Abad, P., Chuliá H., Gómez-Puig, M., 2010. EMU and European government bond market
integration. Journal of Banking and Finance 34(12), 2838-2850.
Alesina, A., Ardagna, S., 1998. Tales of fiscal adjustment: A commentary. Economic Policy
No. 27, 518-522.
Altman, E.I., Rijken, H., 2011. Toward a bottom-up approach to assessing sovereign default
risk. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 23(1), 20-31.
Ang, A., Piazzesi, M., 2003. A no-arbitrage vector autoregression of term structure dynamics
with macroeconomic and latent variables. Journal of Monetary Economics 50(4), 745787.
Ardagna, S., Caselli, F., Lane, T., 2007. Fiscal discipline and the cost of public debt service:
Some estimates for OECD countries. The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics vol. 7.
Bernoth, K., von Hagen, J., Schuknecht, L., 2004. Sovereign risk premia in the European
government bond market. European Central Bank Working Paper No. 369.
Bernoth, K., Hughes-Hallett, A., Lewis, J., 2008. Did fiscal policy makers know what they
were doing? Reasessing fiscal policy with real time data. CEPR Discussion Paper no.
6758.
Bernoth, K., Erdogan, B., 2010. Sovereign bond yield spreads: A time-varying coefficient
approach. European University Viadrina – Department of Business Administration and
Economics Discussion Paper No. 289.
Brunnermeier, M.K., Pedersen, L., H., 2009. Market liquidity and funding liquidity. The
Review of Financial Studies 22(6), 2201-2236.
Buti, M., van den Noord, P., 2004. Fiscal discretion and elections in the early years of EMU.
Journal of Common Market Studies 42(4), 737-756.
Canzoneri, M.B, Cumby R.E., Diba, B.T., 2002. Should the European Central Bank and the
Federal Reserve be concerned about fiscal policy? In: Rethinking Stabilization Policy,
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas – Jackson Hole Symposium, pp. 333-389.
Chinn, M., Frankel, J., 2007. Debt and interest rates: The U.S. and the euro area. Economics
E-Journal - Discussion Paper no.2007-11.
Chung, H., Laforte, J.-P., Reifschneider, D., Williams, J.C., 2012. Have we underestimated
the likelihood and severity of zero lower bound events? Journal of Money, Credit and
Banking 44(S1), 47-82.
Codogno, L., Favero, C., Missale, A., 2003. Yield spreads on EMU Government Bonds.
Economic Policy 18(37), 503-532.
Corsetti, G., Meier, A., Müller, G., 2009. Fiscal stimulus with spending reversals. IMF
Working Paper no. 09/106.

19

Côté, D., Graham, C., 2004. Convergence of Government Bond Yields in the Euro Zone: The
Role of Policy Harmonization, Bank of Canada Working Paper 2004/23.
Cwik, T., Wieland, V., 2009. Keynesian government spending and multipliers in the euro
area. CEPR Discussion Paper No., 7389.
Dötz, N., Fischer, C., 2010. What can EMU countries sovereign bond spreads tell us about
market perceptions of default probabilities during the recent financial crisis? Deutsche
Bundesbank Discussion Paper, Series 1, Economic Studies, No. 11-2010.
Égert, B., 2010. Fiscal policy reaction to the cycle in the OECD: Pro- or counter-cyclical?
OECD Economics Department Working Paper no. 763.
Eichengreen, B.J., Mody, A., 2000. What explains changing spreads on emerging market
debt? In: Edwards, S., (ed.) Capital Flows and the Emerging Economies: Theory,
Evidence, and Controversies. University of Chicago Press, pp. 107-134.
Fratzscher, M., 2011. Capital flows, push versus pull factors and the global financial crisis.
European Central Bank Working Paper No. 1364.
Gabrisch, H., Orlowski, L.T., 2010. Interest rate convergence in the euro-candidate countries:
Volatility dynamics of sovereign bond yields. Emerging Markets Finance and Trade
46(6), 69-85.
Gennaioli, N.A., Martin A., Rossi, S., 2010. Sovereign default, domestic banks and financial
institutions. Centre for Economic Policy Research Discussion Paper No. 7955.
Gerlach, S., Schulz A., Wolff G.B., 2010. Banking and sovereign risk in the euro area. Centre
for Economic Policy Research Discussion Paper No. 7833.
Gjersem, C., 2003. “Financial Market Integration in the Euro Area.” OECD Economics
Department Working Paper No. 368.
Gjerstad, S., Smith, V.L., 2009. From bubble to depression? The Wall Street Journal, April 6.
Goodhart, C.A.E., 1998. The two concepts of money: Implications for the analysis of optimal
currency areas. European Journal of Political Economy 14(3), 407-432.
Golinelli, R., Momigliano, S., 2009. The cyclical reaction of fiscal policies in the euro area:
The role of modeling choices and data vintages. Fiscal Studies 30(1), 39-72.
Gómez-Puig, M., 2006. Size matters for liquidity: Evidence from EMU sovereign yield
spreads. Economic Letters 90(2), 152-162.
Gültekin-Karakaş, D., Hisarciklilar, M., Öztürk, H., 2011. Sovereign risk ratings: Biased
toward developed countries? Emerging Markets Finance and Trade 47(supplement 2) 6987.
Hallerberg, M., Wolff, G. B., 2006. Fiscal institutions, fiscal policy and sovereign risk
premia. Deutsche Bundesbank Discussion Papers. Series 1: Economic Studies, No
25/2006.
Haugh, D., Ollivaud, P., Turner, D., 2009. What drives sovereign risk premiums? An analysis
of recent evidence from the euro area. OECD Economics Department Working Paper
No. 718.
IMF, 2008. Fiscal policy for the crisis. IMF Staff Position Note SPN/08/01. International
Monetary Fund.

20

Iorgova, S., Ong, L.L., 2008. The capital markets of emerging Europe: Institutions,
instruments and investors. IMF Working Paper No. WP/08/103.
Kaminsky, G.L., Reinhart, C.M., Végh, C.A, 2004. When it rains, it pours: Procyclical capital
flows and macroeconomic policies. NBER Working Paper no. 10780.
Kim, S., Lucey, B.M., Wu, E., 2006. Dynamics of bond market integration between
established and accession European Union countries. Journal of International Financial
Markets, Institutions and Money 16(1), 41-56.
Lerner, A. P., 1943. Functional finance and the federal debt. Social Research 10 , 38-51.
Manganelli, S., Wolswijk, G., 2009. What drives spreads in the euro area bond markets?
Economic Policy 24(58), 191-240.
Marattin, L., Salotti, S., 2010. The euro-dividend: Public debt and interest rates in the
Monetary Union. University of Bologna – Department of Economics: Working Paper
No. 695.
Orlowski, L.T., 2008a. Relative inflation forecast as monetary policy target for convergence
to the euro. Journal of Policy Modeling 30(6), 1061-1081.
Orlowski, L.T., 2008b. Stages of the 2007/2008 global financial crisis: Is there a wandering
asset-price bubble? Economics E-journal Discussion Paper No. 2008-43.
Orlowski, L.T., 2012. Financial crisis and extreme market risks: Evidence from Europe.
Review of Financial Economics 21(3), 120-130.
Orlowski, L.T., Lommatzsch, K., 2005. Bond yield compression in the countries converging
to the euro. William Davidson Institute Working Paper No. 799, University of Michigan
School of Business.
Reinhart, C.M., Reinhart, V.R., Rogoff, K.S., 2012. Debt overhangs: Past an present. Harvard
University, mimeo.
Reinhart, C.M., Sbrancia, M.B., 2011. The liquidation of government debt. NBER Working
Paper No. 16893.
Romer, C.D., 2009. Fiscal policy and economic recovery. Business Economics 44(3), 132135.
Sgherri, S., Zoli, E., 2009. Euro area sovereign risk during the crisis. IMF Working Paper
No.WP/09/222.
Skidelsky, R., 2009. Keynes: The Return of The Master. Penguin Books Ltd, London.
von Hagen, J., Schuknecht, L., Wolswijk, G., 2011. Government bond risk premiums in the
EU revisited: The impact of the financial crisis. European Journal of Political Economy
27(1), 36-43.
Wieland, V., 2010. Commentary: Fiscal stimulus and the promise of future spending cuts.
International Journal of Central Banking 6(1), 39-50.

21

22

Figure 1: Spreads of local over German government 10Y bond yields.
Figure 1a: The euro-area countries, quarterly averages
for the sample period 1990 Q1 – 2012 Q1.
20
GR

16

12
GR

8

PT

IR

IT

IT

4
SP

SP

IR

PT

0

-4
90

92

94

96

98

00

S pain S P
Ireland IR
P ortugal PT

02

04

06

Greece GR
Italy IT

08

10

23

Figure 1b: The euro-candidate countries, quarterly averages
for the sample period 2000 Q1 – 2012 Q1:
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Table 1a: Estimation of Eq.(5) for the Euro-Periphery Countries - Pooled Least Squares
with Country Fixed Effects.
Dependent variable: change in the spread between local and German 10Y government bond
yields.
Sample period: 2000 Q1 – 2012 Q1.
Indep.
Variables
→

Constant
term

∆y

∆(G/Y)

∆(D/Y)

∆(TED)

FCD

∆ln(e)

Coefficient
t-statistics
Lead(Lag)

0.047***
(3.58)
NA

-0.025***
(-2.87)
+2

-14.516***
(-4.55)
-1

1.863***
(2.92)
0

0.168***
(5.06)
-1

0.104***
(3.91)
0

-1.442***
(-5.80)
-1

Cross fixed effects:

Descriptive statistics:

Spain: -0.016
Ireland: -0.006
Italy:
-0.033
Portugal: -0.044
Greece: +0.098

Total pool (balanced) observations: 200
Cross sections: 5
Adjusted R²: 0.446
F-statistics: 17.00
Sum of squared residuals: 10.57

Notes: changes in exchange rates ∆ln(e) are specified in terms of USD values of EUR for
euro-area members and USD values of local currencies for the euro-candidates; ∆y = change
in the real GDP growth rate over the same period of previous year; ∆(G/Y) = change in
government spending–to-nominal GDP; ∆(D/Y)= change in public debt-to-nominal GDP;
TED spread is the difference between the 3M USD Libor and 3M US T-bill yield; FCD
financial crisis dummy assumes 1 for the period 2007Q3-2012Q1 and 0 otherwise; ***
denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%.
Data source: Eurostat, OECD Main Economic Indicators, IMF IFS, Datastream.
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Table 1b: Estimation of Eq.(5) for the Euro-Candidate Countries - Pooled Least
Squares with Country Fixed Effects.
Dependent variable: change in the spread between local and German 10Y government bond
yields.
Sample period: 2001 Q1 – 2012 Q1.
Indep.
Variables
→

Constant
term

∆y

∆(G/Y)

∆(D/Y)

∆(TED)

FCD

∆ln(e)

Coefficient
t-statistics
Lead(Lag)

-0.067
(-1.17)
NA

-0.118***
(-3.26)
+2

3.819
(0.43)
-1

4.571**
(2.07)
0

0.424***
(3.06)
-1

0.149
(1.66)
0

-2.019***
(-2.93)
-1

Cross fixed effects:

Descriptive statistics:

Czech R.: 0.012
Hungary: 0.036
Poland: -0.048

Total pool (balanced) observations: 123
Cross sections: 3
Adjusted R²: 0.249
F-statistics: 6.05
Sum of squared residuals: 25.68

Notes: see Table 1a
Data source: as in Table 1a.

Table 2a: Estimation of Eq.(5) for the Euro-Periphery Countries - Pooled Least Squares
on Stacked, Panel Data.
Dependent variable: change in the spread between local and German 10Y government bond
yields.
Sample period: 2000 Q1 – 2012 Q1.
Indep.
Variables
→

∆y

∆(G/Y)*100

∆(D/Y)

∆(TED)

FCD

∆ln(e)

Coefficient
t-statistics
Lead(Lag)

-0.055***
(-2.98)
+1

-0.305***
(-4.97)
-1

5.777***
(12.41)
0

0.365***
(3.25)
-1

0.299***
(3.93)
0

2.43***
(3.37)
0

Country fixed effects:

Descriptive statistics:

Italy:
Greece:
Ireland:
Spain:
Portugal:

Total pool (balanced) observations: 233
Adjusted R²: 0.612
Sum of squared residuals: 62.932

-0.138*
-0.009
-0.133
-0.049
-0.034

Notes: see Table 1a.
Data source: as in Table 1a.
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Table 2b: Estimation of Eq.(5) for the Euro-Candidate Countries - Pooled Least
Squares on Stacked, Panel Data.
Dependent variable: change in the spread between local and German 10Y government bond
yields.
Sample period: 2001 Q1 – 2012 Q1.
Indep.
Variables
→

∆y

∆(G/Y)*100

∆(D/Y)

∆(TED)

FCD

∆ ln ( e )

Coefficient
t-statistics
Lead(Lag)

-0.897***
(-2.66)
+1

-0.135
(-1.49)
0

0.697
(0.36)
0

0.255*
(1.84)
0

0.215**
(2.37)
0

-0.545***
(-2.71)
0

Country fixed effects:

Descriptive statistics:

Czech R: -0.070
Hungary: -0.000
Poland:
-0.108

Total pool (balanced) observations: 136
Adjusted R²: 0.23
Sum of squared residuals: 33.77

Notes: see Table 2a.
Data source: as in Table 1a.
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Annex A: Supporting statistics.
Table 1A: Descriptive statistics of sovereign risk spreads
a) Sample: entire period (1990Q1 – 2012Q1

Mean
Median
Maximum
Minimum
Std. Dev.
Skewness
Kurtosis

Spain
1.623258
0.570000
6.350000
0.010000
1.853768
0.930787
2.542126

Greece
4.182432
1.525000
17.58000
0.150000
5.242209
1.260178
3.322222

Ireland
1.075056
0.490000
7.920000
-0.040000
1.620141
2.681700
10.12252

Italy
1.918989
0.840000
6.470000
0.140000
2.038242
0.802854
2.046622

Portugal
1.932530
0.390000
7.000000
0.000000
2.332111
0.990981
2.397981

Jarque-Bera
Probability

13.62851
0.001098

19.90608
0.000048

294.7989
0.000000

12.93181
0.001556

14.83832
0.000600

Sum
Sum Sq. Dev.

144.4700
302.4082

309.5000
2006.095

95.68000
230.9874

170.7900
365.5898

160.4000
445.9770

Observations

89

74

89

89

83

b) Sample: estimation period
Czech
Republic
0.745
0.675
2.3600
-0.200
0.680
0.422
2.135

Spain

Greece

Ireland

Italy

Portugal

Hungary
3.821
3.570
7.280
1.860
1.324
1.019
3.675

Poland
2.659
2.650
6.830
1.030
1.284
1.424
5.206

0.594
0.220
3.730
0.010
0.925
2.096
6.434

2.503
0.445
22.91
0.150
4.841
2.649
9.591

1.185
0.240
7.920
-0.040
2.113
2.025
5.887

0.723
0.315
4.680
0.140
0.943
2.686
10.24

0.424
0.260
3.210
0.000
0.570
3.326
14.88

Jarque-Bera
Probability

2.922
0.2320

8.641
0.0133

24.33
0.000

61.17406
0.000

148.950
0.000

51.539
0.000

169.188 386.103
0.000
0.000

Sum
Sum Sq. Dev.

35.770
21.724

171.9300
77.100

119.660
72.510

29.700
41.942

125.160
1148.139

59.250
218.791

36.140
43.580

21.180
15.911

Observations

48

45

45

50

50

50

50

50

Mean
Median
Maximum
Minimum
Std. Dev.
Skewness
Kurtosis

-

Table 2A: Unit root test results. Null hypothesis: series has a unit root (yes/no)
Yes: p-values ≥ 0.1;
Period: estimation period
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Variables Countries
Period

Greece

Ireland

2000Q12011Q1

Italy

Portugal Spain

2000Q1-2012Q1

Czech
Rep.
2000Q22012Q4

Hungary

Poland

2001Q1-2012Q1

Test
SRP
YGOV
DBR

ADF/PP

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

ADF

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

borderline

PP

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

borderline

ADF/PP

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

borderline

yes

yes
EX

ADF/PP
yes

EX_FD
EX_VAR
USTED

ADF/PP
ADF

yes

PP

yes

yes

borderline

yes

ADF/PP
(2000Q22012Q1)

borderline

yes

yes

yes

yes

---

---

---

Borderline: p-values of one or both test results > 0.05

